NAFTA, We Hafta: Thirty-Three Years of North American Trade Rhetoric Meet the Record

Future Insight — part of the Xin.bz Future Insights series.

Every generation of North American trade policy has run on a slogan. In 1993 the ratification campaign for the North American Free Trade Agreement put a rhyme on it: NAFTA, we hafta. The Washington Post ran it as an opinion headline, a Colorado business coalition’s television spot carried it as a title, and the Clinton White House stood three former presidents beside the sitting one to sell it. Thirty-three years later a shipment of Canadian whisky is turned back at the border, and beer, wine, whey and large motorcycles with it, under a statute written in 1930. Ninety-six years separate the statute from the bottles, and the trade data sits beside every slogan in between.

At a glance

Classification	North American Trade War, 1930–2036
Category	Future Insights — trade policy & industrial supply chains
Primary Industry	Autos and parts, steel and aluminum, lumber, dairy, spirits and beer, energy
Trade at Stake	$872 billion U.S.–Canada goods and services in 2025; $1.9 trillion trilateral goods and services in 2024
Tariff Coverage	Roughly 85% of Canada–U.S. trade moved duty-free under USMCA as of August 2025; sectoral tariffs cover about 15% of Canadian exports
Import Exclusions	$846 million of 2025 imports excluded from September 29, 2026
Canadian Response	CA$27.6 billion counter-tariffs at 15–50% from September 8, 2026; CA$7.5 billion support package
Escalation Pending	50% on all Canadian autos, parts and steel from January 1, 2027
Agreement Status	USMCA in force; 16-year extension declined July 1, 2026; annual reviews to a July 1, 2036 expiry
IEEPA	1977 emergency-powers law used for the first tariffs; struck down by the Supreme Court in February 2026
Section 232	1962 national-security tariff power; covers steel, aluminum, autos, lumber, copper
Section 122	1974 balance-of-payments surcharge, capped at 15% and 150 days; ran February to July 2026
Section 301	1974 unfair-practices duty; the 10–12.5% global baseline since July 24, 2026
Section 338	1930 discrimination clause; up to 50% duties, then exclusion; first use July 2026
USMCA Chapter 31	The agreement’s dispute panels; a working forum with suspension-of-benefits remedies
Primary Indicator Watch	Statistics Canada monthly U.S. export share
Secondary Indicator Watch	Section 338 annex changes, Chapter 31 filings, CAPE refund disbursements, the January 1, 2027 auto tariff

1930: the statute and the retaliation

The road begins with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, signed on June 17, 1930. Canada answered a month before the ink dried. In May of that year Ottawa placed new duties on 16 categories of U.S. goods, about 30% of everything the United States sold to Canada. R.B. Bennett won the election that summer on a promise of more, and delivered it. Two years later the Ottawa Agreements gave Commonwealth goods preferential rates while U.S. goods paid full duty. World trade fell 66% between 1929 and 1934, and one influential study attributes half of that collapse to the tariff war.

Section 338 sits inside the same 1930 act. It lets a president add duties of up to 50% on a country found to discriminate against U.S. commerce and, if the discrimination continues, exclude that country’s products entirely. Officials in the 1930s discussed it against France, Germany, Australia, Spain, Japan and China and used it as leverage with France and Spain. Its first actual use to impose duties came 96 years later, on July 20, 2026, against Canada.

1965: one auto industry

The integration that every 2026 auto tariff lands on was built in 1965. Lester Pearson and Lyndon Johnson signed the Automotive Products Agreement in January. It removed tariffs on cars, trucks, buses and parts between the two countries in exchange for production commitments from the Big Three. In 1964 seven percent of the vehicles built in Canada went south. Four years later the figure was sixty percent, and forty percent of cars bought in Canada were built in the United States. The 1988 Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement extended that model across the economy, and NAFTA extended it to Mexico. Parts now cross the border repeatedly before final assembly, so a tariff on a Canadian vehicle is a tariff on an Ohio or Michigan plant as well.

1971: the surcharge and the cap

The emergency-tariff precedent belongs to Richard Nixon. On August 15, 1971 he declared a national emergency under the Trading with the Enemy Act and put a 10% surcharge on all dutiable imports. The surcharge lasted four months and ended two days after the Smithsonian Agreement on exchange rates. Congress answered in the Trade Act of 1974 with Section 122, which caps any balance-of-payments surcharge at 15% and 150 days. That 1974 cap is why the 10% surcharge imposed in February 2026 expired on July 24 and had to be replaced.

1993: NAFTA, we hafta

The pitch was jobs, exports and cars. President Clinton told the country the agreement would create 200,000 U.S. jobs by 1995 and a million in its first five years. In a November radio address he gave the numbers. The Big Three expected to go from selling 1,000 cars a year in Mexico to 60,000 in the first year. Mexico’s purchases of American computers had risen from 120,000 units to 390,000 and were heading for 600,000. Export jobs paid 17% more than other jobs. Ross Perot, from the previous year’s presidential debates, had supplied the counter-slogan: a “giant sucking sound” of jobs going south. Presidents Bush, Carter and Ford stood with Clinton at the White House on September 14 to sign the side agreements. The House passed the implementing act 234–200 on November 17, the Senate 61–38 three days later, and the agreement took effect on New Year’s Day 1994.

The record filled in over the next two decades. Trilateral goods trade went from about $330 billion in 1993 to $1.2 trillion in 2016, and goods and services trade reached $1.9 trillion in 2024. On jobs, the U.S. International Trade Commission’s 2016 review found “a substantial increase in trade volumes for all three countries; a small increase in U.S. welfare; and little to no change in U.S. aggregate employment.” The Economic Policy Institute counted 682,900 jobs displaced by the Mexico deficit through 2010 and 850,000 across Mexico and Canada by 2013. U.S. industrial production rose 49% in the twelve years after the agreement against 28% in the twelve years before. The two findings measure different things. One counts gross displacement in specific industries and towns. The other counts net national employment. Both are true, and the 1993 slogan ran ahead of one and behind the other.

2016 to 2020: the rewrite

The next slogan arrived in the September 26, 2016 presidential debate, when candidate Trump called NAFTA “the worst trade deal maybe ever signed anywhere.” Four years later President Trump called its replacement “the best agreement we’ve ever made.” The United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement kept the NAFTA architecture and changed four things that govern today’s dispute. Auto regional content rose from 62.5% to 75%. A new labor rule required 40% of a car’s value, and 45% of a light truck’s, to come from workers earning $16 an hour or more. Seventy percent of a vehicle’s steel and aluminum had to be North American. Canada opened tariff-rate quotas on U.S. dairy equal to 3.6% of its market.

The fifth change was the clock. The agreement runs sixteen years, with a joint review at year six. If any party declines the extension at that review, the agreement moves to annual reviews and expires on July 1, 2036. That review fell on July 1, 2026, and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer declined. The clause written into the 2018 text now governs everything that follows.

2018: the eleven-month steel cycle

The most recent precedent for today’s metals tariffs opened on June 1, 2018, when 25% duties on Canadian steel and 10% on aluminum took effect under Section 232. It closed on May 17, 2019, when a joint statement removed both sets of duties and Canada’s CA$16.6 billion retaliation within two days. The cycle lasted eleven and a half months and ended as the path to USMCA ratification cleared. The 2025 steel and aluminum tariffs on Canada are twice the 2018 rate and have run sixteen months.

2025 to 2026: five statutes in twenty months

The current war opened on February 1, 2025 with a declared fentanyl emergency and tariffs of 25% on Canadian goods and 10% on energy under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Canada announced a CA$155 billion retaliation package the same day. Both sides paused for a month, then the tariffs and the first CA$30 billion of counter-tariffs took effect on March 4, and provincial liquor boards pulled American products from their shelves. Three days later goods that qualified under USMCA were exempted, which left roughly 85% of the trade duty-free for the rest of the year. Section 232 tariffs followed on steel and aluminum in March, autos in April, and copper, lumber and furniture through the autumn. Steel and aluminum doubled to 50% in June. Talks were terminated twice, once over Canada’s digital services tax, which Ottawa rescinded within days, and once over an Ontario television advertisement quoting Ronald Reagan on tariffs.

On February 20, 2026 the Supreme Court ruled in Learning Resources v. Trump that the tariff power sits with Congress and outside IEEPA. Every IEEPA tariff ended four days later, and a 10% global surcharge under Section 122 took their place, with USMCA goods exempt. The Court of International Trade ordered $166 billion refunded to about 330,000 importers, and Customs opened its CAPE portal on April 20 to pay it, with interest accruing at about $650 million a month. On July 1 the USMCA review declined the extension. On July 20 the first Section 338 proclamations put 50% duties on about $20 billion of Canadian dairy, alcohol, vehicles and other goods. On July 24 the Section 122 surcharge hit its 150-day limit and Section 301 duties of 10% to 12.5% on 60 economies replaced it.

The August negotiation came within hours of a deal. Prime Minister Carney submitted a proposal on August 18 and the 50% duties were suspended for three days. On August 19 the president called the deal done “subject to finalization of documents.” In the final hours before the August 21 deadline U.S. negotiators removed medium and heavy trucks, including pickups, from the tariff relief. Carney called the changed terms “unfair, uneconomic” and said Washington had “asked too much and offered too little.” Greer said Canada “declined to finalize.” The 50% duties took effect on August 22. Two days later the president announced 50% tariffs on all Canadian autos, parts and steel for January 1, 2027. The announcement carried the words “WE DON’T NEED CANADA, THEY NEED US.” Three days after that an executive order renamed Lake Ontario “Lake America” in federal usage. On September 8 Canada’s CA$27.6 billion counter-tariffs took effect at 15% to 50% on more than 700 products, and the president signed five more proclamations. Those proclamations carry the exclusions that begin September 29.

Date	Action	Authority
Feb 1, 2025	25% on Canadian goods, 10% on energy; Canada announces CA$155 billion retaliation	IEEPA
Mar 4, 2025	U.S. tariffs and Canada’s first CA$30 billion counter-tariffs take effect; provinces pull U.S. alcohol	IEEPA
Mar 7, 2025	USMCA-compliant goods exempted	Executive order
Mar 12, 2025	25% on steel and aluminum	Section 232
Apr 3, 2025	25% on autos; Canada matches on U.S. vehicles	Section 232
Jun 4, 2025	Steel and aluminum to 50%	Section 232
Jun 27–30, 2025	Talks terminated over the digital services tax; Canada rescinds it; talks resume	—
Aug 1, 2025	Non-USMCA goods to 35%; copper to 50%	IEEPA; Section 232
Aug 22, 2025	Canada drops most counter-tariffs to match the USMCA exemption	—
Sep–Oct 2025	Lumber duties raised to 35.16%, then 10% more on lumber and 25–50% on furniture	Lumber V; Section 232
Oct 23, 2025	Talks terminated over Ontario’s Reagan advertisement	—
Feb 20, 2026	Supreme Court strikes down every IEEPA tariff; collection ends Feb 24	Learning Resources v. Trump
Feb 24, 2026	10% global surcharge for 150 days, USMCA goods exempt	Section 122
Apr 20, 2026	CAPE refund portal opens for $166 billion	Court of International Trade
Jul 1, 2026	Joint review; U.S. declines the 16-year extension	USMCA Art. 34.7
Jul 20, 2026	50% on about $20 billion of Canadian goods, effective in 30 days	Section 338
Jul 24, 2026	Surcharge expires; 10–12.5% on 60 economies replaces it, USMCA goods exempt	Section 301
Aug 18–21, 2026	Three-day suspension; deal called done; trucks removed from relief; talks collapse	—
Aug 22, 2026	50% Section 338 duties take effect	Section 338
Aug 24, 2026	50% on all Canadian autos, parts and steel announced for Jan 1, 2027	Section 232
Aug 27, 2026	Lake Ontario renamed “Lake America” in federal usage	Executive order
Sep 8, 2026	Canada’s CA$27.6 billion counter-tariffs take effect; five more U.S. proclamations	Section 338
Sep 29, 2026	Exclusion of Canadian beer, wine, cider, spirits, whey, molasses and motorcycles over 800cc	Section 338(b)

The claims, one at a time

The subsidy. The president has said the United States subsidizes Canada by $200 billion a year, and by $250 billion at Davos. The 2025 U.S. goods deficit with Canada was $48.3 billion. Services ran a $27.7 billion surplus in the other direction, so the combined deficit was about $20.6 billion on $872 billion of two-way trade. Energy trade alone was $137 billion, and 69% of it was crude oil that Gulf Coast and Midwest refineries are configured to run. Excluding oil, the United States runs a surplus with Canada.

The fentanyl emergency. Customs and Border Protection seized 43 pounds of fentanyl in the northern border region in fiscal 2024. That was 0.2% of its national fentanyl seizures. The southwest-border figure runs in the thousands of kilograms a year.

The dairy tariffs. Canada’s over-quota dairy rates run from 241% to 298%, and those rates apply above tariff-rate quotas. U.S. dairy exports to Canada reached $1.3 billion in 2025, 14% of all U.S. dairy exports, and every dollar of it entered below the over-quota rate. The calendar-year quotas were about 27% filled at the end of 2024. The live dispute between the two governments is how Canada administers the quotas.

The vehicle and alcohol declines. The July 2026 White House fact sheet reported that Canadian imports of U.S. motor vehicles fell about 22%, or $5.6 billion, and that Canadian imports of U.S. alcoholic beverages fell about 81%, or $582 million. Canada’s 25% counter-tariff on U.S. vehicles took effect April 3, 2025, the same day as the U.S. auto tariff, and the provincial liquor boards removed U.S. products in March 2025 in answer to the IEEPA tariffs. The declines the fact sheet cites as discrimination are the retaliation for the earlier U.S. actions.

Who walked away. The September fact sheet says Canada broke off trade talks. The record of August 18 to 21 shows a proposal submitted, a deal called done, and a change to the truck terms in the final hours before the deadline. Greer’s account is that Canada declined to finalize. Both statements describe the same forty-eight hours.

Who needs whom. The United States sold Canada $333.6 billion of goods and $92.3 billion of services in 2025. Mexico bought $337.9 billion of U.S. goods the same year and passed Canada as the largest single market for the first full calendar year. Canada’s own exports tell the other half: the U.S. share fell ten points in two years while sales to the rest of the world set a record. Each country’s dependence shows in the other’s data.

The sixty-billion-dollar deficit. The August 24 statement attributed a $60 billion deficit to Canadian farm tariffs. The goods deficit was $48.3 billion in 2025 and $63 billion in 2024, and crude oil is the largest single line in it. U.S. agricultural exports to Canada exceed $30 billion a year.

The 1993 campaign ran ahead of the jobs data. The 2025–26 campaign runs ahead of the deficit data. In both cases the figures sat in public Census tables while the slogans ran.

September 29: what stops at the border

The exclusions cover about $846 million of 2025 imports. Spirits are the largest line at about $680 million. Canadian whisky alone sold 17.5 million nine-liter cases in the United States in 2023 for about $2.3 billion in distiller revenue. Whey products worth $25.3 million, 45% of the U.S. imported-whey market, join the list with molasses and motorcycles over 800cc. Spirits Canada reports that half of Canadian spirits production serves U.S. demand and that 93% of the country’s 2025 spirits export value went south.

The annex draws its line at container size. Canadian whisky shipped in bulk above four liters to U.S. bottling plants falls outside it, and Crown Royal, the largest Canadian whisky brand in the United States, ships that way. The exclusion lands on packaged shelf brands and craft distillers and leaves the largest volume moving. Goods already in bonded warehouses before September 29 clear at the 50% rate. The July annex was also rewritten on September 8: rock salt and cement came out, all-terrain vehicles and more dairy lines went in.

The legal ground is narrow for both governments. GATT Article XI limits members to duties, taxes and charges. Article XIII requires any restriction to apply to all members alike. USMCA Article 2.11 incorporates both, and Section 338 sits outside the U.S. exceptions in the agreement’s Annex 2-A. The WTO Appellate Body sits empty, so a WTO case ends at a panel report the United States can appeal into the void. The USMCA’s own Chapter 31 panels function, and Article 31.19 lets a winning party suspend equivalent benefits. Canada holds a working forum and has priced its response at dollar-for-dollar.

Side	Industry or product	Measure
Canadian exports	Autos and parts	25% now; 50% announced for Jan 1, 2027
Canadian exports	Steel and aluminum	50%; steel exports to the U.S. down about half
Canadian exports	Softwood lumber	About 45% with anti-dumping, countervailing and 232 duties stacked
Canadian exports	Copper	50%
Canadian exports	Furniture and cabinets	25–50%
Canadian exports	Dairy, alcohol, vehicles, ATVs and about 110 other lines	50% under Section 338
Canadian exports	Packaged spirits, wine, cider, beer; whey; molasses; motorcycles over 800cc	Excluded from Sep 29, 2026
U.S. exports	Steel, aluminum and iron products	50%
U.S. exports	Dairy	50% on milk powders, whey, milk protein concentrate and casein; 25% on cheese
U.S. exports	Agricultural equipment, appliances, electronics, pulp and paper, seafood, clothing, cosmetics, furniture, motorcycles, alcohol	15–50% across 700-plus products
U.S. exports	Alcoholic beverages	Removed from provincial shelves since March 2025; sales down 81%
Both	Energy	10% in 2025, then exempt through every round

What the trade data shows now

Statistics Canada’s July 2026 release recorded a 6.6% monthly drop in exports to the United States, the steepest since April 2025. The U.S. share of Canadian exports stood at 66.3%, against 76% two years earlier. Exports to other countries rose 7.4% to a record CA$25.6 billion, the highest share in four decades.

The Bank of Canada’s April assessment placed the damage where the sectoral tariffs land. Steel exports have fallen by half. Lumber runs about 20% below 2024. Aluminum fell 50% at the trough and has recovered more than half of that. Copper runs 40% above its 2024 average. Autos sit slightly below 2024 and are recovering. The industries under sectoral tariffs make up about 1% of Canadian output and employment and roughly 15% of Canadian exports. Ottawa’s August 25 package put CA$7.5 billion behind them. It runs to CA$1.5 billion in regional tariff response, a CA$2 billion diversification fund and CA$3.5 billion in worker supports, alongside a CA$10 billion large-enterprise loan facility extended to 36 months.

Canada raised its own walls against third countries in the same period, with surtaxes of 25% to 50% on over-quota steel from partners outside its free-trade agreements. The bloc is fragmenting at the U.S.–Canada seam and hardening at its outer edge at the same time. That is the pattern the Ottawa Agreements produced in 1932.

The IEEPA tariffs that opened the war were collected on Canadian goods from March 4, 2025 to February 24, 2026, and every dollar is being returned. A tariff regime justified by a fentanyl emergency ended as a $166 billion refund across all countries, paid by the Treasury to the importers who paid it, with interest.

2027 to 2036

The USMCA remains in force. Every July 1 from 2027 the three governments meet again, and the 16-year extension is available at any point through written confirmation by all three heads of government. Mexico is negotiating; its fourth round in Washington stalled on the U.S. demand for 50% U.S.-specific content in vehicles. Canada has attended the Commission and held off text-based negotiation while the exclusions and the January 2027 auto tariff stand.

Three structural facts outlast any slogan. The auto industry was designed as one system in 1965, and every tariff on it is a tax on U.S. assembly. Canadian crude is the feedstock U.S. heavy refineries were built for, which is why energy stayed at 10% and then exempt through every round. And Canada and Mexico together take about 31% of U.S. goods exports, which is why the retaliation lists keep landing on dairy, spirits, farm machinery and steel.

What can move the market?

Indicator	Confirmation signal	Business meaning
Section 338 annex	Bulk-container line closed, or dairy lines widened	The whisky exclusion reaches Crown Royal; U.S. bottlers and Canadian distillers lose the workaround
USMCA Chapter 31 filing	Canada requests a panel on Article 2.11	The exclusions get a functioning legal test with suspension-of-benefits remedies
January 1, 2027 auto tariff	Proclamation published under Section 232	50% on Canadian vehicles and parts hits Michigan, Ohio and Ontario plants in the same quarter
Statistics Canada export share	U.S. share below 65%	Diversification is structural, and Canadian volumes leave North American supply chains for good
CAPE refund pace	Monthly disbursements above $10 billion	Importers recover the 2025 tariff cost while 2026 tariffs accumulate
Provincial liquor boards	U.S. products return to LCBO and SAQ shelves	The discrimination finding under Section 338 loses its stated basis
July 1, 2027 annual review	Three-party confirmation of extension	The 2036 clock stops

Xin.bz bottom line

The road from 1930 to 2036 runs through five slogans and one set of Census tables. Bennett’s retaliation and the Ottawa Agreements sent Canadian trade toward the Commonwealth for a generation. The Auto Pact built one industry on both sides of the border. Nixon’s four-month surcharge produced the statutory cap that expired this July. “NAFTA, we hafta” promised a million jobs and delivered a sixfold increase in trade with flat aggregate employment. “Worst deal ever” produced an agreement that kept the architecture and added the clock now running. The 2018 steel cycle ended in eleven and a half months with a joint statement; the 2026 cycle has already run longer and carries an instrument from 1930.

The 2025–26 grievances cite a $200 billion subsidy that is a $20.6 billion combined deficit, a fentanyl emergency that is 0.2% of seizures, and dairy tariffs that every U.S. exporter has cleared below the quota line. The exclusions that begin September 29 remove $846 million of goods and exempt the largest Canadian whisky by container size. Canada is diversifying at a pace the data now shows, and the United States is refunding the tariffs that started the war while writing new ones.

The structural facts hold. The auto supply chain is one system, Canadian crude is the U.S. refinery feedstock, and Canada and Mexico are the two largest markets for American goods. The next decade of North American trade will be decided by annual reviews, panel rulings and container sizes, and by whichever government reads the ledger before it writes the slogan.

Sources / market data

• Clinton White House. The President’s Radio Address, November 6, 1993; NAFTA side-agreement signing with Presidents Bush, Carter and Ford, September 14, 1993.
• The Washington Post. “NAFTA: Why We Hafta.” Opinion, September 19, 1993.
• Office of the Clerk, U.S. House; U.S. Senate. Roll-call votes on H.R. 3450, November 17 and 20, 1993.
• U.S. International Trade Commission. Economic Impact of Trade Agreements Implemented Under Trade Authorities Procedures, June 2016.
• Economic Policy Institute. “NAFTA’s Legacy: Growing U.S. Trade Deficits Cost 682,900 Jobs”; “Heading South,” 2011–2014.
• The Canadian Encyclopedia; Chicago Fed. Canada–U.S. Automotive Products Agreement (1965).
• EH.net; Journal of Economic History. Smoot-Hawley and Canada’s 1930 reaction; Ottawa Agreements, 1932.
• Congressional Research Service. The Trading with the Enemy Act and the 1971 surcharge (IN11129); U.S.–Canada Trade Relations (IF12595); Executive Order 14193 (IN12533); USMCA Joint Review (R48787); Section 338 (R49349); Softwood Lumber (R48781).
• Morrison Foerster; Borden Ladner Gervais; Global Trade Alert. Section 338 history and first use, July 2026.
• U.S. Trade Representative. Canada country page (2025 trade figures); USMCA fact sheets; Joint Statement on Section 232, May 17, 2019; Ambassador Greer statement on the Joint Review, July 2026.
• U.S. Census Bureau and BEA. U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, annual 2025; Mexico and Canada export totals.
• U.S. Energy Information Administration. “Lower crude oil prices reduced U.S.–Canada energy trade value in 2025.”
• U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Northern border drug seizure statistics, FY2024.
• The White House. Fact sheets on Section 338 tariffs (July 2026) and on Canada’s retaliation (September 2026); Federal Register 91 FR 58325.
• Government of Canada, Department of Finance. Counter-tariff product lists (2018, 2025, 2026) and the August 25, 2026 support package.
• Global Affairs Canada. Softwood lumber recent developments, 2025.
• Statistics Canada. Canadian International Merchandise Trade, July 2026.
• Bank of Canada. Monetary Policy Report, April 2026, “One year later.”
• University of Wisconsin Extension. “Canada’s 2026 Retaliatory Dairy Tariffs.”
• Spirits Canada. Statement on the September 8, 2026 U.S. announcement.
• Blakes. “U.S.–Canada Tariffs: Timeline of Key Dates and Documents.”
• Skadden; Aprio. IEEPA refund mechanism and CAPE portal analyses, 2026.
• Diplomacy and Law. “Trump’s Canadian Import Ban: WTO and USMCA Limits on Section 338.”
• Reuters, Bloomberg, CNBC, CBC, NPR, CNN, Al Jazeera, Time, DTN. Reporting on the August–September 2026 escalation.

Evidence cutoff: September 21, 2026. U.S. trade figures are Census and USTR annual data for 2025 unless otherwise stated; Canadian figures are Statistics Canada and Department of Finance releases, in Canadian dollars where marked CA$.